THE SIX PRINCIPLES OF WORLD ORDER

 

THE WORLD NEWSREEL

OUR COMMENT ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

THE SIX PRINCIPLES OF WORLD ORDER

Why International Law Is Becoming Incoherent

October 25, 2026 | Strategic Affairs — The Editorial Desk

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I. TWO POWERS, TWO GLACIS

Consider two maps.

The first depicts Russia and its western approaches. Ukraine and Belarus form the geographical space separating Russia's European heartland from the military powers of Central Europe. Their political alignment determines the strategic depth available to Moscow.

The second depicts the United States and the Western Pacific. Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and the successive island chains form a strategic perimeter through which American power is projected and the expansion of rival military power is constrained.

The geographical configurations are different. One is predominantly continental; the other maritime. Yet the underlying strategic calculation is remarkably similar.

Neither power defines its security interests exclusively by reference to its sovereign borders.

Both regard the military and political configuration of neighbouring regions as a matter of national security.

This observation does not establish which territorial arrangements are legitimate. It identifies a problem that contemporary international law has never satisfactorily resolved: what principles determine the legitimate organization of international space?

The answer depends upon which conception of world order we adopt.

And there is more than one.

II. THREE MODELS OF LEGITIMACY

Modern international relations are governed by three competing principles of legitimacy.

1. The Realist Model — Kissinger

In World Order (2014), Henry Kissinger returned to a fundamental proposition of classical diplomacy: international order depends upon an equilibrium among major powers, each possessing its own historical experience, strategic interests and conception of legitimacy.

The relevant political units are not necessarily equal in power or influence. International stability emerges from arrangements that accommodate the distribution of power and prevent any single actor from overturning the system.

Its underlying principle resembles constitutional checks and balances, transposed to the international level.

Just as a constitutional system distributes authority among competing institutions, a realist international order distributes effective power among competing geopolitical centres.

Its hard core is equilibrium among great powers and their strategic spaces.

2. The Idealist Model — Wilson

Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points of January 1918 expressed a fundamentally different conception.

The legitimacy of international order rests upon the right of peoples and political communities to determine their own political destiny.

In its universalized form, this principle applies independently of the distribution of military power. A small nation's political independence cannot be made conceptually subordinate to the strategic requirements of a larger neighbour.

The relevant unit is the people or nation-state, not the great-power system.

Its hard core is self-determination.

3. The International Democratic Model — Roosevelt

Franklin D. Roosevelt introduced a third conception, particularly through his Four Freedoms of 1941 and the ideological objectives of the Second World War.

International legitimacy could no longer depend exclusively upon sovereignty or equilibrium. The internal political character of states also became relevant.

Freedom of expression, religious liberty, freedom from want and freedom from fear supplied an emerging international vocabulary of fundamental rights.

In its subsequent development, this conception associates legitimate international conduct with democratic institutions, constitutional government and human rights.

Its hard core is the conformity of political authority and its actions to internationally recognized democratic and human-rights principles.

These three models need not be mutually exclusive. But neither do they necessarily produce the same conclusions.

A territorial arrangement may satisfy the requirements of strategic equilibrium while conflicting with self-determination. A sovereign political decision may conform to national independence while conflicting with a democratic conception of international legitimacy.

Thus the first problem of international law is already apparent: different principles may produce different judgments concerning the legitimacy of the same political situation.

III. THREE MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT

There is, however, a second question, logically distinct from the first.

Even if the legitimate principles of international order could be agreed upon, who would maintain that order?

Here again, three competing models can be identified.

1. The International League Model — The United Nations

Order is maintained through an international organization representing the community of states.

Its institutions establish procedures, formulate collective decisions and authorize measures for the maintenance or restoration of international peace.

The United Nations represents the most developed historical expression of this model, although its Security Council incorporates important great-power privileges.

2. The Hegemonic Model — The American Security System

Order is maintained principally by a predominant military power possessing the capacity to enforce international arrangements.

In the contemporary American experience, this function is associated with the global military establishment, the Pentagon, overseas bases, security guarantees and worldwide operational capabilities.

International order depends not merely upon agreed rules, but upon the military capacity of a hegemonic state to sustain them.

3. The Classical European Model — Spheres of Control

Order is maintained through the coexistence of great powers exercising effective control or predominant influence within their respective strategic spheres.

Rather than requiring a universal institution or a single global enforcer, this model relies upon reciprocal accommodation, territorial arrangements and limitations upon competing interventions.

Its historical reference is the classical European international system, including the traditions of the balance of power and the Concert of Europe.

Once again, these are not necessarily exclusive arrangements.

Roosevelt himself combined an ambitious conception of international freedoms with a proposed system of great-power enforcement. His original Four Policemen envisaged the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and China as the principal guardians of postwar security.

The future United Nations thus emerged partly from a combination of universal institutional aspirations and the recognition of unequal geopolitical power.

IV. THE NINE POSSIBLE ORDERS

The distinction between principles of legitimacy and mechanisms of enforcement produces a simple analytical matrix.

Legitimacy / Enforcement	International League	Hegemonic Power	Spheres of Control
Realist	Collective management of great-power equilibrium	Hegemonic stabilization of the balance	Reciprocal great-power accommodation
Idealist	Collective protection of self-determination	Hegemonic protection of national independence	Territorial autonomy secured by reciprocal restraint
International Democratic	Multilateral enforcement of democratic and human-rights standards	Hegemonic enforcement of democratic standards	Differentiated political orders within respective spheres

These nine combinations are ideal types, not nine mutually exclusive historical systems.

Indeed, the actual positions adopted by states may be understood as variable combinations of all six principles.

Each government, political movement or international institution may adhere more or less strongly to the hard core of each model, producing a particular configuration of legitimacy and enforcement.

A state may invoke self-determination in one dispute, strategic equilibrium in another, and international democratic legitimacy in a third.

It may simultaneously demand enforcement by the United Nations, rely upon the protection of a hegemonic military power, and insist upon freedom of action within its own regional sphere.

Such combinations are not necessarily the result of deliberate inconsistency.

They may reflect the simultaneous operation of different conceptions of world order within the same political and legal system.

V. THE COMBINATORIAL DISORDER

This brings us to the distinctive predicament of contemporary international law.

The usual explanation for the present disorder is that the international community has abandoned the principles upon which the postwar system was constructed.

But perhaps the opposite is closer to the truth.

The crisis may result not from a shortage of principles, but from their proliferation and simultaneous application.

The contemporary international system contains elements of Wilsonian self-determination, Rooseveltian international democracy and Kissingerian equilibrium.

It also contains institutions of collective security, structures of hegemonic military enforcement and persistent spheres of strategic influence.

These principles survive together, despite the fact that they originated in different historical circumstances and rest upon different conceptions of political legitimacy.

They are neither fully integrated into a coherent constitutional order nor arranged according to an agreed hierarchy.

Consequently, different actors can construct plausible but conflicting accounts of the same international event by selecting different combinations of principles.

The disagreement is no longer simply about the interpretation of a particular rule.

It concerns the underlying conception of international order from which the rule derives its meaning.

VI. THE RETURN TO GEOGRAPHY

We may now return to our two maps.

Russia's western glacis and America's Pacific perimeter illustrate the continuing relevance of the realist conception of strategic space.

The competing claims of neighbouring political communities introduce the Wilsonian principle of self-determination.

The political character of governments, the international protection of rights and the institutional commitments of democratic states introduce the Rooseveltian conception.

Finally, the question of who may legitimately preserve, modify or enforce these arrangements introduces the three competing mechanisms of international order.

The result is not a single controversy governed by a single set of principles.

It is a conflict among different combinations of legitimacy and enforcement.

This is why contemporary debates about international law so frequently seem to proceed in parallel rather than converge upon a common answer.

The participants are not always disagreeing about the facts. Nor are they necessarily disagreeing about the text of particular international instruments.

They may be reasoning from different constitutional conceptions of the international system itself.

The resulting incoherence is therefore structural.

The contemporary crisis of international law is not simply the disappearance of world order.

It is the simultaneous operation of several potentially incompatible principles of world order, none of which has succeeded in establishing an undisputed priority over the others.

We live not in a world without principles, but in a world governed by too many competing principles claiming authority over the same events.

And perhaps that is the most revealing feature of the international situation today.

P. G. Monateri

CI-CLE — Critical Legal Enquiry Cardozo Institute

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The World Newsreel — Know today the truths of tomorrow.

Historical references: Henry Kissinger, World Order (2014); Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Points Address (January 8, 1918); Franklin D. Roosevelt, Four Freedoms Address (January 6, 1941); Roosevelt's proposals at the Tehran Conference (1943).

Russia's Western Glacis and America's Pacific Frontier

 

THE GEOGRAPHY OF SECURITY

Russia's Western Glacis and America's Pacific Frontier

Geography does not determine foreign policy, but it establishes some of its enduring constraints.

For centuries, Russia's position as a European power has depended partly on the strategic depth provided by the territories between its principal cities and the military powers of Central Europe. Ukraine and Belarus occupy much of that space.

Their possible integration into Western military structures would fundamentally alter Russia's strategic geography. A historical comparison with the Eastern Front of the Second World War illustrates the territorial dimensions of this transformation, without implying any equivalence between NATO and the German invasion of 1941.

The principle is not uniquely Russian. The United States, itself a Pacific power, has long regarded the western Pacific, its island chains and its network of alliances as central to American national security. In both cases, strategic thinking extends beyond national borders into surrounding geographical spaces.

Henry Kissinger's late reflections on Ukraine emphasized that a durable European settlement would have to reconcile Ukrainian independence with a broader security order that included Russia.

Recognizing a country's strategic interests does not establish a right to control its neighbours. Nor does national sovereignty eliminate the geographical concerns of surrounding powers.

The enduring diplomatic question is how competing security interests can coexist without turning strategic geography into territorial conquest.

The World Newsreel — Strategic Affairs

TWO POWERS, TWO GLACIS

The American security perimeter in the Pacific illustrates the same geopolitical principle represented in our preceding map of Russia's Western Glacis. Both powers regard strategic depth beyond their national borders as an essential component of national security.

For Russia, the crucial geographical space is Ukraine and Belarus; for the United States, it is the Pacific island chains, including Taiwan, Japan and the Philippines.

The historical circumstances, alliances and legal relationships are different, but the underlying strategic logic is comparable: great powers seek security not merely at their borders, but through the geopolitical configuration of the regions beyond them. 

The Geopolitical Symmetry of Strategic Depth

The two maps illustrate a common structural feature of great-power security: neither Russia nor the United States defines its strategic interests exclusively by reference to its sovereign borders. Both regard the political and military configuration of neighbouring regions as essential to national security.

For Russia, Ukraine and Belarus constitute the principal geographical corridor between its European heartland and Central Europe. Their alignment determines the strategic depth available to Russia and the proximity of Western military power to its major political and industrial centres.

For the United States, the Western Pacific island chains constitute a comparable strategic perimeter. Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines occupy geographical positions that influence the distance between Chinese military power and American forward positions, the security of Pacific communications and the regional balance of power.

In both cases, the central strategic concern is the same: preventing a rival power from establishing a dominant military position in a geographically sensitive neighbouring region.

The differences concern geography and means rather than the underlying security principle. Russia's glacis is predominantly continental; America's is predominantly maritime. Russia seeks strategic depth through the alignment of neighbouring states; the United States maintains its Pacific position through alliances, military facilities and security partnerships.

Neither configuration is static, and neither creates sovereign rights over the territories concerned. Ukraine and Belarus are sovereign states, as are Japan and the Philippines; Taiwan has its own distinct and contested international status.

The comparison therefore concerns neither the equivalence of political regimes nor the legitimacy of particular military actions. It identifies a recurring feature of international politics: the security interests of great powers extend beyond their borders.

A Military and Strategic Chronology, 2022–2026

 

HW1 — THE FIRST HYBRID WAR

The World Newsreel Historical Atlas — Volume I

The Historical Method

The First Hybrid War, or HW1, is the provisional designation adopted by The World Newsreel for the international military and strategic confrontation that developed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.

The designation describes a historical interpretation, not a formally declared war or a single legally constituted armed conflict.

The various campaigns possessed different origins, belligerents and political objectives. Their inclusion in this chronology rests upon identifiable strategic relationships, rather than an assumption that they were directed by a single coalition or headquarters.

For geographical clarity, this atlas employs conventional historical English names familiar from twentieth-century military histories: Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, the Dnieper, the Donets Basin, the Sea of Azov, the Crimea, the Baltic and the Persian Gulf. Contemporary official names may differ.

The period is divided into five successive campaigns.

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CAMPAIGN I — 2022

The Great Eastern Offensive

24 February — Opening of the Eastern Campaign.

Russian armies advanced along three principal axes: the northern approaches to Kiev, the Kharkov sector and the southern front extending from the Crimea towards Kherson and the Sea of Azov.

The opening operation displayed the characteristics of a rapid campaign of manoeuvre: airborne assaults, armoured thrusts, simultaneous attacks upon command centres and attempts to disorganise the opposing state before its forces could complete mobilisation.

The assault on Hostomel airfield was intended to support the seizure of Kiev.

The operation failed to achieve its principal political and military objective.

March–April — The Battle of Kiev and the Northern Withdrawal.

Russian forces encountered sustained Ukrainian resistance, logistical difficulties and counterattacks. By early April, the northern offensive had been abandoned.

The withdrawal from the Kiev sector represented the first major reversal of the campaign.

13–14 April 2022 — The Battle of the Black Sea: Sinking of the Moskva.

Ukrainian coastal forces struck the Russian guided-missile cruiser Moskva, flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, with Neptune anti-ship missiles. Severely damaged, the cruiser sank on 14 April while under tow. Russia acknowledged the sinking but disputed the Ukrainian account of the attack.

The loss of the Moskva was a major naval reversal. It deprived the Russian Black Sea Fleet of its flagship and an important air-defence platform, demonstrating the vulnerability of large surface warships to land-based anti-ship missiles.

Strategic assessment: Although Ukraine possessed no comparable surface fleet, its coastal missile forces had inflicted a major defeat upon Russian naval power. The engagement foreshadowed the subsequent struggle for control of the western Black Sea and the approaches to Odessa.

May — The Siege of Mariupol.

Russian forces completed the capture of Mariupol, securing the land corridor along the northern coast of the Sea of Azov.

The southern campaign had achieved more durable territorial results than the northern offensive.

September — The Battle of Kharkov.

Ukrainian forces launched a rapid counteroffensive, recovering extensive territory east and southeast of Kharkov, including Izium and Kupiansk.

November — The Dnieper Withdrawal.

Russian forces withdrew from the western bank of the Dnieper at Kherson.

The year ended without the decisive victory sought by the initial invasion.

The Intervention of the Western Powers

The United States supplied intelligence, financial assistance, artillery, air-defence systems and other military equipment.

Britain expanded training and weapons deliveries.

Poland became a principal logistical centre for the movement of military assistance into Ukraine and reinforced its own eastern defences.

Germany abandoned important elements of its previous security policy, increased military spending and began expanding arms deliveries.

France supplied weapons and participated in strengthening NATO deployments in Eastern Europe.

Italy contributed military assistance and reinforced NATO's defensive presence, particularly in southeastern Europe.

These measures did not constitute a NATO invasion of Russian territory or make the Alliance a collective belligerent in Ukraine.

They nevertheless altered the strategic balance of the Eastern Campaign.

Strategic assessment: the attempt to achieve a rapid decision failed. The conflict expanded from an invasion of Ukraine into a prolonged confrontation affecting the security architecture of Europe.

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CAMPAIGN II — 2023

The Consolidation of the Eastern Front and the Opening of the Flanks

January–May — The Battle of Bakhmut.

Russian forces, including substantial Wagner formations, conducted a prolonged assault on Bakhmut in the Donets Basin.

The capture of the city followed months of exceptionally costly fighting.

June–Autumn — The Southern Offensive.

Ukrainian forces attempted to penetrate Russian defensive positions towards the Sea of Azov.

Minefields, artillery, prepared fortifications and extensive drone reconnaissance prevented a decisive breakthrough.

The principal Eastern Front increasingly assumed the character of a fortified zone.

15 April — Opening of the Sudan Campaign.

Fighting erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces.

Khartoum became a major battlefield. The campaign subsequently extended through the Darfur and Kordofan regions.

Its inclusion in HW1 is based on its international repercussions and external military relationships, not upon a demonstrated operational connection with the Eastern Campaign.

7 October — Opening of the Palestine Campaign.

Hamas-led forces attacked southern Israel. Israeli forces subsequently conducted a major campaign in the Gaza Strip.

8 October — The Lebanese Frontier.

Exchanges of fire began between Hezbollah and Israel.

November — The Red Sea Campaign.

Houthi operations against commercial shipping transformed the southern approaches to the Suez Canal into a maritime security theatre.

The Northern Strategic Reorganisation

On 4 April 2023, Finland entered NATO.

This was one of the most consequential strategic changes of the period.

The Finnish frontier added approximately 1,340 kilometres of Russian-NATO land border.

The Baltic and Arctic approaches consequently acquired greater significance in Alliance planning.

Germany, France, Britain, Poland and the Nordic states began adjusting military deployments and defence planning to the altered strategic geography.

Strategic assessment: the Eastern Front became increasingly difficult to penetrate. Meanwhile, other campaigns developed in Africa and the Middle East, and the northern European strategic system underwent a major reorganisation.

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CAMPAIGN III — 2024

The Great Attempts at Breakthrough

February — The Battle of Avdeevka.

Russian forces captured Avdeevka after prolonged fighting, compelling a Ukrainian withdrawal.

The operation demonstrated that fortified positions could still be taken, although often at considerable cost.

May — The Second Kharkov Offensive.

Russian formations crossed the frontier north of Kharkov, attempting to create new tactical opportunities and compel Ukrainian forces to divert reserves.

The offensive did not achieve a decisive strategic breakthrough.

6 August — The Kursk Offensive.

Ukrainian forces entered Russian territory in the Kursk region.

The operation introduced a new geographical dimension to the Eastern Campaign, obliging Russia to defend territory beyond the previously established front.

September–October — The Lebanese Offensive.

Israel intensified operations against Hezbollah, including attacks upon its command structure and communications systems, followed by ground operations in southern Lebanon.

April and October — The Persian Missile Engagements.

Iran and Israel exchanged direct missile and aerial attacks, demonstrating the possibility that indirect confrontation might develop into sustained interstate operations.

NATO's Great European Manoeuvres

From January to May 2024, NATO conducted Steadfast Defender 24, involving approximately 90,000 personnel.

The exercise rehearsed the reinforcement of Europe by forces arriving from North America, the defence of Atlantic communications and the movement of formations across the European continent.

It was a military exercise, not an attack upon Russia.

Its historical significance lay in the scale of mobilisation and in the renewed emphasis on continental reinforcement.

On 7 March 2024, Sweden entered NATO.

The accession of Sweden, following that of Finland, transformed the strategic geometry of the Baltic.

The northern European defence system now included both states as full members of the Atlantic Alliance.

Strategic assessment: the principal Eastern Front remained contested. Offensive operations sought opportunities along its northern and southern sectors, while the Baltic, Arctic and Middle Eastern theatres gained importance.

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CAMPAIGN IV — 2025

The War of Depth and Strategic Interdiction

January–March — The Sudanese Counteroffensive.

Sudanese government forces recovered important positions in Khartoum, eventually re-establishing control over the capital.

The Rapid Support Forces continued operations elsewhere, especially in western Sudan.

March–April — The Kursk Withdrawal.

Russian counteroperations recovered the principal areas occupied by Ukrainian forces during the previous year's offensive.

1 June — Operation Spiderweb.

Ukrainian drones attacked Russian military airfields far from the established front.

The operation illustrated the growing importance of strategic interdiction conducted through comparatively inexpensive unmanned systems.

13–24 June — The Twelve-Day Persian Campaign.

Israeli air operations struck Iranian military and nuclear-related targets.

Iran responded with missile and drone attacks.

The United States subsequently struck Iranian nuclear facilities.

A ceasefire ended the principal exchange of attacks, but not the underlying strategic confrontation.

The Deployment of the European Powers

Germany: continued expansion of military assistance to Ukraine and the development of a permanent brigade deployment in Lithuania, marking a significant change in German forward-defence policy.

France: maintained its leading role in NATO's multinational presence in Romania and continued supplying military equipment and training to Ukraine.

Italy: led NATO's multinational battlegroup in Bulgaria and contributed to other eastern deployments, alongside military assistance to Ukraine.

Poland: continued to serve as a major logistical hub, expanded military procurement and maintained a central position in NATO's northeastern defence planning.

Britain: maintained a leading NATO presence in Estonia, supported Ukrainian training and strengthened northern European security cooperation.

NATO also launched Baltic Sentry following incidents affecting critical undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea.

Strategic assessment: the contest increasingly extended beyond the front line. Military airfields, industrial production, maritime routes, communications and energy infrastructure became strategically significant targets or vulnerabilities.

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CAMPAIGN V — 2026

The Great Persian Offensive and the Extension of the Maritime Front

28 February — Opening of the Great Persian Offensive.

United States and Israeli forces launched major strikes against Iran, targeting military command structures, missile capabilities and nuclear-related facilities.

The operation represented a substantial escalation from the limited direct engagements of previous years.

Iran retaliated against Israel, American military facilities and targets across the Gulf region.

March — The Gulf Counteroffensive.

Iranian missile and drone operations expanded the geographical consequences of the campaign.

The Strait of Hormuz became a central point of strategic and economic pressure.

Maritime interdiction, restrictions on shipping and attacks upon regional military infrastructure gave the campaign consequences far beyond the immediate battlefield.

March — Renewal of the Lebanese Campaign.

The confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah again intensified, adding pressure to the eastern Mediterranean theatre.

April–October — The Persian Armistice Negotiations and Maritime Confrontation.

Negotiations, pauses in operations, continuing military pressure and disputes over navigation and sanctions followed the initial offensive.

These developments constituted successive phases of the Persian Campaign, rather than the outbreak of a separate war each time military operations resumed.

The Northern and Eastern European Deployment

In June 2026, NATO established a multinational forward land force in Finland, led by Sweden.

Germany continued its military presence in Lithuania.

France remained the framework nation for the multinational force in Romania.

Italy retained its framework role in Bulgaria and contributed to several other multinational formations.

Poland continued to occupy a central position in NATO's eastern logistical and defensive system.

These deployments formed part of NATO's deterrence and collective-defence posture. They must be distinguished from combat operations within Ukraine.

Strategic assessment: by October 2026, the international confrontation included sustained land operations in Eastern Europe, direct aerial and maritime operations in the Persian Gulf, continuing military crises in the Levant and Sudan, and extensive NATO preparations along the European frontier.

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THE FIVE CAMPAIGNS AT A GLANCE

Year	Military character	Principal development
2022	Campaign of manoeuvre	Invasion, rapid advances, failed decision at Kiev, counteroffensives
2023	Consolidation and flanking campaigns	Fortified fronts, Sudan, Palestine, Red Sea, Finnish accession
2024	Breakthrough attempts	Kharkov, Kursk, Avdeevka, Lebanese operations, Swedish accession, NATO manoeuvres
2025	Strategic interdiction	Deep drone strikes, Sudanese counteroffensive, Twelve-Day Persian Campaign, European forward deployments
2026	Major Persian offensive	US–Israeli strikes, Iranian retaliation, Gulf maritime confrontation, northern NATO reinforcement

The Strategic Position in October 2026

The First Hybrid War had not produced a single continuous front extending across continents.

It had produced something structurally different: a series of military theatres connected by alliances, strategic resources, industrial capacities, technological systems and international institutions.

The Eastern Campaign remained predominantly a struggle for territory.

The Persian Campaign placed air power, missiles, maritime access and economic coercion at its centre.

The Sudanese Campaign combined territorial warfare with the involvement of armed formations and external interests.

The Baltic and Arctic regions became theatres of deterrence, military preparation and strategic competition rather than open conventional battle between NATO and Russian forces.

The distinction is essential.

A historical atlas must record where armies actually fought, where governments supplied matériel, where alliances deployed troops and where military operations remained hypothetical.

The unity of HW1 is therefore a proposition about the structure of the international system.

It is not a claim that all participating states belonged to two formally constituted opposing armies.

The central historical question is whether these campaigns, taken together, constituted a new form of prolonged international war — one whose political and strategic boundaries extended far beyond its battlefields.

Chronology closed: 24 October 2026.

The World Newsreel — Historical Atlas of HW1