Showing posts with label Geopolitics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Geopolitics. Show all posts

10/25/26

THE WORLD NEWSREEL SUNDAY, OCTOBER 25, 2026 — INTERNATIONAL EDITION


THE WORLD NEWSREEL

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 25, 2026 — INTERNATIONAL EDITION

Know today the truths of tomorrow.

SUNDAY EXTRA — THE STORIES SHAKING THE WORLD

October 25, 2026


IRAN PLANS NEW STRIKES ON AMERICANS — U.S. EMBASSIES ON ALERT!

Intelligence warning raises fears of a new phase in the Persian Campaign




WASHINGTON. American intelligence officials say Iran is in the advanced stages of planning attacks against U.S. diplomats and personnel in the Middle East and possibly beyond.

The warning, reported by The New York Times, has prompted Washington to reduce staffing at diplomatic missions in Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Nonessential personnel and their families have also been ordered to leave Saudi Arabia.

Two senior Iranian officials reportedly acknowledged that Tehran was preparing operations against American personnel. One was identified as a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.

The officials described the contemplated attacks as retaliation for the killing of Iranian officials during the American-Israeli campaign.

U.S. intelligence also reports indications of Iranian operatives operating inside the United States.

The warnings come eight months into the American-Israeli war against Iran, with energy prices rising and American military installations across the region facing sustained pressure.

The intelligence assessments have not established when or where an attack might occur.

But the strategic significance is clear.

The Persian Campaign may be entering a phase in which diplomatic personnel, intelligence networks and civilian infrastructure become increasingly important targets.

An embassy is not a battlefield.

It may nevertheless become a front.

Sources: The New York Times report · The Times of Israel, October 25


NETANYAHU VOWS TO TOPPLE IRAN'S REGIME — TRUMP BLOCKS PLANNED AIR OFFENSIVE!




Israeli premier orders military and intelligence chiefs to pursue regime change — reports reveal a major bombing campaign was prepared for October

JERUSALEM, October 25. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has declared the overthrow of Iran's government a central objective of Israeli national security, saying he has instructed the armed forces, Mossad and other security agencies to pursue that goal.

Speaking to military officers on October 21, Netanyahu accused Iran's leadership of attempting to rebuild its nuclear and military capabilities.

He argued that destroying weapons and military installations would not be sufficient while the present government remained in power.

The announcement followed an even more explicit pledge to Israeli journalists on October 18: Netanyahu said he intended to bring down the Iranian regime.

But the most consequential development may have occurred behind closed doors.

According to the Financial Times, Israel prepared a major bombing offensive against Iran for the weekend of October 10. The operation reportedly envisaged several days of strikes against power stations, nuclear facilities and government targets.

It never began.

President Donald Trump reportedly opposed renewed large-scale hostilities before the American midterm elections on November 3.

Netanyahu has continued pressing for action. Washington, however, has not publicly committed itself to another offensive.

The distinction is critical.

Israel has demonstrated the capacity to strike Iranian military and strategic installations. Whether air power can actually overthrow a government is a different question, one that military history has repeatedly left unresolved.

There is also the electoral calendar.

Israel votes on October 27. The United States votes on November 3.

Two governments face voters while considering decisions that could determine the next phase of the Persian Campaign.

THE BOMBERS WERE PREPARED. THE OPERATION WAS STOPPED. THE OBJECTIVE HAS NOT BEEN ABANDONED.

Sources: Financial Times · ANSA, October 21 · The Times of Israel · AFP

NETANYAHU THREATENS WEST BANK OFFENSIVE ON A SCALE UNSEEN SINCE 1967!





Israeli troops move into Hebron as prime minister promises sweeping military action — just four days before election

JERUSALEM, October 25. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has warned that Israel is preparing a major military operation in the occupied West Bank, invoking the Six-Day War of 1967 as the measure of its unprecedented scale.

The announcement followed Friday's shooting near Hebron, where Palestinian gunmen killed two Israeli soldiers and wounded three others. Israeli forces subsequently killed the attackers.

Netanyahu said the army was ready and that his government would determine the timing of the wider offensive.

Israeli forces have already begun demolitions and evacuations around Hebron. Palestinian families have been displaced, while military checkpoints and road closures have severely restricted movement.

In a television interview, Netanyahu also promised a major surprise for the Palestinian Authority, without specifying what action he intended.

The timing is politically significant. Israel votes on Tuesday, October 27, and the prime minister has made national security central to his campaign.

The reference to 1967 carries exceptional historical weight. The Six-Day War brought the West Bank and East Jerusalem under Israeli occupation and transformed the territorial foundations of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Whether the proposed offensive will fundamentally alter the West Bank's political arrangements remains unknown.

But the announcement has already raised the stakes of the Palestinian Campaign.

SIXTY YEARS AFTER 1967, THE WEST BANK IS AGAIN AT THE CENTRE OF ISRAEL'S MILITARY AND POLITICAL CALCULATIONS.

Sources: AFP / Arab News · NPR, October 24 · Agenzia Nova


FRANCE EXPLODES AGAIN! 410,000 MARCH — NEARLY 1,000 DETAINED!

Paris sees tear gas and water cannon as the government deploys 70,000 security personnel

PARIS. More than 410,000 people marched across France Saturday in another massive wave of demonstrations against rising living costs, education cuts and economic inequality.

The CGT union claimed participation was considerably higher, approaching 800,000.

In Paris alone, police estimated 110,000 demonstrators.

The government mobilised approximately 70,000 security personnel in an effort to prevent a repetition of the previous weekend's widespread rioting and looting.

Most demonstrations remained peaceful.

But clashes erupted in Paris, Marseille, Lyon, Bordeaux, Toulouse and Rennes.

Masked protesters threw fireworks and other objects. Police responded with tear gas, water cannon and charges against sections of the crowds.

Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez reported nearly 1,000 detentions nationwide.

The movement began with student protests over inadequate school funding and staff shortages. It has since expanded to include workers demanding better wages, improved educational facilities, additional student support and measures against rising housing costs.

The political consequences are growing.

Marine Le Pen's National Rally is preparing for the presidential contest, while Jean-Luc Mélenchon's political movement has expressed support for the demonstrators.

The Yellow Vests have called for further protests on October 31. Trade unions are preparing another day of action in November.

France is not witnessing a single demonstration.

It is witnessing a prolonged confrontation over the distribution of economic burdens.

The police can clear a square.

They cannot clear a national budget.

Sources: Associated Press · Euronews, October 25 · CNN


RIYADH UNDER MISSILE THREAT! HOUTHIS TARGET AIRPORTS AND OIL!

Saudi defences intercept fresh attacks as the Red Sea Campaign widens

RIYADH. Saudi air defences intercepted drones and missiles Sunday as the country's confrontation with Yemen's Houthi movement intensified.

Saudi authorities reported the interception of drones and ballistic missiles aimed at Riyadh and southern Saudi Arabia, including threats to Taif, Yanbu and Khamis Mushait.

The Houthis claimed attacks on airports, oil facilities and military installations.

Their military spokesman renewed warnings against using Riyadh's King Khalid International Airport, describing it as a military target.

The airport had suspended operations after an October 10 attack that killed 13 people and injured more than 300. Limited operations were scheduled to resume Sunday.

The new attacks follow Saudi strikes against Houthi positions in Yemen and renewed fighting over territory near the Red Sea coast.

The strategic geography is unforgiving.

Saudi Arabia's airports connect the kingdom to international commerce. Its oil installations influence global energy markets. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a principal passage for maritime trade between Europe and Asia.

The Houthis do not need to occupy Riyadh to impose costs upon it.

They need only make its essential infrastructure more difficult, expensive and dangerous to operate.

This is the economic logic of the Red Sea Campaign.

The missiles are local.

The consequences travel.

Sources: Reuters, October 25 · Anadolu Agency


MUSK'S SATELLITES, UKRAINE'S WAR -- WHO CONTROLS THE SWITCH?


Starlink restrictions lifted after days of disruption to Ukrainian military operations

KIEV. Ukraine announced Saturday that normal operating speeds had been restored to Starlink and Starshield satellite communications after days of restrictions affecting military operations.

President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed the restoration, thanking American officials and others who had helped resolve the dispute.

The interruption had affected Ukrainian drone operations, reconnaissance and battlefield coordination.

Military personnel reported communication losses and restrictions affecting equipment travelling at high speeds.

The affair drew the attention of President Trump, members of Congress and the American State Department.

But an important question remains unanswered.

Who ordered the restrictions?

SpaceX chief Elon Musk said Starshield was controlled by the United States government. Administration officials denied responsibility for the interruption.

The episode exposed an extraordinary feature of contemporary warfare.

A national army depends upon communications infrastructure supplied by a private corporation. The corporation operates within a commercial, technological and governmental environment that does not correspond neatly to military command.

The result is a new strategic vulnerability.

A battlefield communications network may be interrupted without a single enemy missile being fired.

For Ukraine, the immediate problem has been resolved.

For military planners everywhere, the larger question remains.

Who controls the switch?

Sources: Office of the President of Ukraine, October 24 · The Washington Post · Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty


THE WORLD NEWSREEL — SUNDAY EXTRA

Know today the truths of tomorrow.


THE WORLD GOES TO THE POLLS — WHILE THE WAR COMES HOME!

Brazil chooses a president, Serbia's students challenge a strongman, Bulgaria votes under the shadow of Black Sea drone attacks, and Europe's streets become the newest political battleground.





TODAY'S MORE HEADLINES

BRAZIL IN A DEAD HEAT! Lula and Bolsonaro's son battle for the presidency — with Washington watching.

STUDENTS TAKE ON SERBIA'S STRONGMAN! An uprising born from a railway disaster reaches the ballot box.

DRONE WAR REACHES NATO'S BLACK SEA COAST! Bulgaria votes after deadly attacks on merchant shipping.

ITALY BRACES FOR ANOTHER WEEKEND OF UNREST! Police deploy across major cities as demonstrations continue.

STARLINK SHOWDOWN! Ukraine's military communications become the subject of a dispute with Elon Musk.

SIX GOALS IN NAPLES! Napoli and Roma provide the sort of entertainment politicians can only promise.




STRATEGIC DESK — DISPATCHES FROM HW1

DRONES STRIKE IN THE BLACK SEA — BULGARIA GOES TO THE POLLS!

SOFIA. Bulgarian voters are choosing a president today under circumstances that would have seemed extraordinary only a few years ago.

Drone attacks on merchant vessels off the Bulgarian Black Sea coast have reportedly killed approximately two dozen international seafarers. Sofia has sought allied assistance to strengthen maritime security.

Bulgaria has not formally blamed Russia for the attacks. Prime Minister Rumen Radev has nevertheless said their consequences benefit Moscow.

The leading presidential contenders offer different responses to the Ukrainian war. Acting President Iliana Iotova emphasizes diplomacy and public exhaustion; former caretaker prime minister Andrey Gyurov advocates stronger support for Kiev.

The presidency is largely ceremonial. The political signal will not be.

The Black Sea has become a place where commercial shipping, military technology and electoral politics meet.

STARLINK BACK ON — MUSK AND KIEV TRADE ACCUSATIONS!

KIEV. Ukraine says its Starshield communications service has returned to normal after disruption. Elon Musk, meanwhile, has accused Kiev of violating the terms governing its use.

The dispute is more than a quarrel over a subscription service.

Satellite communications have become an important component of modern battlefield coordination. Yet the infrastructure is supplied by a private company whose commercial and contractual decisions may carry strategic consequences.

The central question is not whether Ukraine needs communications. It plainly does.

It is whether a modern army can safely depend on infrastructure whose ownership, governance and military obligations do not resemble those of a conventional defence establishment.

The nineteenth century had private arms manufacturers. The twenty-first has private communications systems operating inside the chain of military effectiveness.

That is an interesting development for anyone still convinced that war is exclusively a government enterprise.

HOUTHI WARNING PUTS RIYADH AIRPORT IN THE SPOTLIGHT!

RIYADH. Yemen's Houthi movement has renewed its warning against the use of Riyadh airport amid reports of attacks involving Saudi infrastructure and oil facilities.

The wider Red Sea and Arabian Peninsula theatre remains a reminder that the geographical boundaries of the Middle Eastern confrontation are remarkably elastic.

Airports, shipping routes, oil facilities and insurance premiums are all potential pressure points.

In conventional military history, the capture of a city could decide a campaign. In contemporary strategic warfare, threatening the systems through which a city functions may be sufficient to produce political and economic effects.

The immediate military claims require continued verification. The strategic logic is unmistakable: pressure the infrastructure, and the costs travel far beyond the battlefield.


WORLD DESK

BRAZIL'S POLITICAL DYNASTIES COLLIDE — LULA FIGHTS FOR HIS JOB!

SÃO PAULO. Brazil votes today in a presidential runoff that has turned into a battle between two of the country's most powerful political traditions.

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva faces Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro.

Flávio finished the first round with 47 percent of the vote against Lula's 45 percent, but the final polls indicate a contest too close to call.

The election has revolved around crime, corruption, household debt and the cost of living. It has also acquired an unmistakable American dimension.

President Trump has criticized the prosecution of Jair Bolsonaro and imposed tariffs on Brazil. Flávio promises a tougher approach to crime and has pledged to free his father, convicted in 2025 over an attempted coup plot.

The stakes are enormous. Brazil is Latin America's largest economy, a major agricultural power and a country whose diplomatic alignment matters well beyond South America.

For the moment, the voters have the last word.

That privilege expires when the counting begins.

SERBIA'S STUDENTS CHALLENGE VUČIĆ AT THE BALLOT BOX!

BELGRADE. A protest movement that began after the deaths of 16 people in the collapse of a railway station canopy at Novi Sad in 2024 has reached its most consequential test.

Serbia holds a snap parliamentary election today.

The student-led opposition is challenging the political establishment of Aleksandar Vučić, who has dominated Serbian politics for more than a decade.

What began as anger over a construction disaster developed into a broader campaign against corruption and the concentration of political power.

The transformation from street movement to electoral challenge is the central story.

Demonstrations can express dissatisfaction. Elections can convert it into institutional authority — provided the votes are counted, the results accepted and the institutions remain capable of transferring power.

Serbia is about to discover whether the energy of its university campuses can survive contact with the electoral machinery.

FROM PARIS TO BARCELONA, EUROPE'S STREETS ARE RESTLESS!

EUROPE. France experienced another day of largely peaceful demonstrations punctuated by violence in Paris. Barcelona reported arrests after rioters looted shops and set fires. Italian cities also saw extensive police deployments.

The grievances differ from country to country. So do the organisations involved.

But the combination of high living costs, political frustration, international conflicts and social-media mobilisation is becoming a familiar European pattern.

It would be a mistake to assign a single cause to all these disturbances.

It would be an equally serious mistake to imagine that the techniques of mobilisation, amplification and imitation stop at national frontiers.

In the age of digital political organisation, a protest can acquire an international audience long before its organisers have acquired a coherent political programme.


ITALY & AFFAIRES

POLICE FLOOD ITALIAN CITIES — PROTESTS CONTINUE, MAJOR LOOTING AVERTED!

MILAN / TURIN / ROME. Italy's police were deployed in force Saturday as antiwar and cost-of-living demonstrations continued across the country.

Reuters reported clashes in Turin, Rome and Bologna, while Milan's rallies were largely peaceful. Despite fears of a repetition of the previous weekend's looting and property damage, its correspondents reported no comparable incidents on Saturday.

The authorities had prepared for trouble. Many shops closed as a precaution.

Police also detained an individual suspected of involvement in organising the online October 17 Movement, whose messages had encouraged further demonstrations.

The legal investigation into that network continues.

For the moment, the immediate result is straightforward: the demonstrations went ahead, some clashes occurred, but the extensive destruction feared by shopkeepers did not materialise.

A city may survive a demonstration. Whether its political institutions can answer the grievances that produced it is another question.


EDITORIAL DESK

THE WAR HAS FOUND ITS WAY INTO THE VOTING BOOTH

By the Editorial Desk

Good evening.

There was a time when governments fought wars abroad and elections at home. It was a convenient arrangement. The soldiers knew where the front was, the politicians knew where the voters were, and the public was invited to believe that the two activities belonged to different departments.

That arrangement is becoming difficult to maintain.

Today, Brazil votes for a president while the United States makes no secret of its interest in the outcome. Serbia's students seek to translate nearly two years of demonstrations into parliamentary power. Bulgaria chooses a president after lethal drone attacks on shipping in the Black Sea. Across Europe, protesters are discovering that a public square can become an international stage without anybody having to cross a frontier.

These are separate events. They have different causes, different histories and different political actors. Yet their simultaneity tells us something about the world in which they occur.

International conflict no longer waits politely outside domestic politics.

It enters through energy prices, public debt, military spending, digital communications, migration, propaganda and the everyday arithmetic of the household budget.

An army can occupy territory. A war can occupy the political imagination of a continent.

This is the central proposition behind our continuing coverage of HW1 — The First Hybrid War. Not that every disturbance is ordered from the same headquarters, nor that every election is secretly a military operation. Such claims would require evidence, and evidence is not improved by enthusiasm.

The proposition is more interesting: the contemporary international struggle is being conducted through several systems of power at once.

Military operations alter economic expectations. Economic expectations alter elections. Elections alter alliances. Alliances alter military operations.

The battlefield is no longer a sufficient map of the war.

Consider the extraordinary spectacle of the next ten days. Brazil, Serbia, Israel and the United States face consequential electoral contests. The candidates do not agree on much. But they all know that their decisions will be judged against an international order already under strain.

The old distinction between foreign affairs and domestic affairs has not disappeared.

It has simply become increasingly expensive to maintain.

Good night, and good luck.



THE SILVER SCREEN

JANE AUSTEN RETURNS — AND GOTHAM GETS UGLY!

ROME. Italian cinemas have welcomed an unusually entertaining collision of literary respectability and comic-book horror.

Sense and Sensibility brings Jane Austen's Dashwood sisters back to the screen under director Georgia Oakley, with Daisy Edgar-Jones as Elinor.

Thirty years after Ang Lee's celebrated adaptation, the question remains whether a new generation can improve upon Emma Thompson's formidable achievement.

The costumes, fortunately, have never been the problem.

Clayface, directed by James Watkins, takes a Batman villain into the territory of body horror. Gotham's criminal population apparently has decided that ordinary organized crime is insufficiently unpleasant.

For those seeking something more serious, Urchin, Harris Dickinson's directorial debut, follows a homeless young man struggling through London's streets. It arrived in Italian cinemas on October 22.

TRAINSPOTTING RETURNS AFTER THIRTY YEARS — THE RENT IS STILL DUE!

Danny Boyle's Trainspotting has returned to Italian cinemas in a restored 4K edition marking its thirtieth anniversary.

The film that once seemed to define the rebellious 1990s now qualifies as a historical document.

Ewan McGregor and his companions are still young, Edinburgh is still unforgiving, and the soundtrack still makes respectable middle age seem a regrettable misunderstanding.

A film about people who refused to grow up has itself become thirty years old.

That may be its cruelest joke.


FASHION DESK 

LORO PIANA TAKES CASHMERE TO THE ART MUSEUM!

HOUSTON. The Fall/Winter 2026–27 campaign from Loro Piana is photographed by Mario Sorrenti at the Menil Collection and Rothko Chapel.

It is a clever choice of setting.

The campaign presents clothes through movement, texture and the restrained architecture of the galleries rather than the customary theatrics of the runway.

There are two kinds of luxury advertising. One announces the price. The other assumes that anybody who needs to ask has entered the wrong building.

Loro Piana has traditionally preferred the second.


The photography does the work.

No catwalk required.

Explore the official Loro Piana Fall/Winter 2026–2027 campaign, photographed by Mario Sorrenti at Houston's Menil Collection and Rothko Chapel.


THE NINETEENTH HOLE — GOLF

SIX MILLION DOLLARS AT STAKE IN BERMUDA!

SOUTHAMPTON, BERMUDA. The PGA Tour's Butterfield Bermuda Championship reaches its final round today at Port Royal Golf Course, with a $6 million purse.

The tournament brings professional golf to one of the sport's more photogenic settings, where Atlantic winds can turn a routine approach shot into an argument with geography.

Adam Schenk is the defending champion.

Elsewhere, the LPGA's BMW Ladies Championship concludes in South Korea, while the PGA Tour Champions plays the Stifel Charity Classic in Missouri.

Three tournaments, three generations of professional golf, and a reminder that the sport remains one of the few occupations in which a man can spend four hours walking through beautiful countryside and describe the experience as a terrible day at the office.

CHACARRA WINS IN INDIA — THE GLOBAL GAME HAS NEW ADDRESSES!

Spain's Eugenio Chacarra won last week's DP World India Championship in New Delhi.

The victory is another reminder that international golf is no longer organised exclusively around the traditional British and American centres.

The game now travels through Asia, the Gulf, continental Europe and the Americas.

The nineteenth hole has become a remarkably international institution.


SOCCER DESK — CALCIO

SIX-GOAL MADNESS IN NAPLES! ROMA REFUSE TO DIE!

NAPLES. Napoli and Roma drew 3–3 on Saturday in the weekend's outstanding Serie A spectacle.

Scott McTominay scored twice for Napoli, including a goal in the 83rd minute that appeared to have secured the match.

Roma, however, had other plans.

Leonardo Balerdi equalised in the 89th minute, completing a comeback in a game that had already featured goals from André-Frank Zambo Anguissa and Matías Soulé.

Napoli collected one point. Roma collected one point.

The spectators collected six goals and an excellent reason to complain about their blood pressure.

TORINO SCORES THREE — AND STILL FINDS TIME TO SUFFER!

TURIN. Torino defeated Monza 3–2 on Friday in a match that appeared determined to keep its spectators nervous until the final whistle.

Kian Fitz-Jim, Rafik Belghali and Nikola Vlašić scored for the home side. Monza's late consolation came through an own goal in stoppage time.

Three goals, three points and absolutely no guarantee of tranquility.

The city can now return to its customary concerns, at least until the next fixture.

INTER HOST FIORENTINA — JUVENTUS FACE LECCE!

Sunday's Serie A programme features Inter against Fiorentina, Atalanta against Frosinone, Genoa against Venezia, Lecce against Juventus and Udinese against Milan.

Saturday's results included Como's 2–0 victory over Sassuolo, Bologna's 2–0 win at Cagliari and Lazio's 2–1 defeat of Parma.

Italian football has arranged a full weekend of entertainment.

The country's politicians should consider asking the league for scheduling advice.


ACADEMY & ARCHAEOLOGY

THE LOST CHURCH OF VENICE FOUND — AFTER SIXTEEN CENTURIES!

ALTINO, ITALY. Archaeologists from Ca' Foscari University of Venice have identified the remains of what is probably the oldest episcopal church in the Venetian area.

The church, constructed between the late fourth and early fifth centuries, measures approximately 30 by 20 metres. Beside it stands a substantial complex believed to have served as the bishop's palace.

The discovery is particularly interesting because written sources had long indicated the existence of an important Christian community at Altino, but its principal ecclesiastical buildings had remained elusive.

The excavation also illuminates the gradual movement of settlement and authority toward the islands of the Venetian lagoon.

Venice did not simply appear from the water.

Its institutions had ancestors on the mainland — and those ancestors have begun to emerge from the earth.

TROY GIVES UP A FLUTE — 2,800 YEARS AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED!

ÇANAKKALE, TURKEY. Excavators at Hisarlık, the site of ancient Troy, have recovered a fragment of a bone flute approximately 2,800 years old.

Turkish authorities describe it as the first musical instrument discovered at the site.

Researchers have also recovered an anthropomorphic idol head from an earlier phase of occupation, approximately 4,500 years old.

The objects belong to different periods of Troy's long history, a useful reminder that the archaeological city was inhabited and rebuilt across many centuries.

Homer gave Troy its most famous voices.

Archaeology has now supplied evidence of an actual instrument.

Unfortunately, the musician has declined to be interviewed.

AN ANCIENT GODDESS RETURNS — WITH THREE NYMPHS!

IVAYLOVGRAD, BULGARIA. Archaeologists excavating the Balak Dere sanctuary have uncovered a rare marble relief depicting Cybele, the great mother goddess, accompanied by three nymphs.

The sanctuary appears to date from the third century AD and remained associated with pagan worship into Late Antiquity.

A water channel around the complex may help explain the presence of the nymphs, divinities closely associated with springs and natural waters.

The building was destroyed by fire around the middle of the fifth century. Whether religious conflict was responsible remains uncertain.

The discovery is an excellent reminder that the Christianisation of the Roman world was neither instantaneous nor geographically uniform.

The old gods did not all leave on the same afternoon.

A CHILD'S TOMB, THIRTY OFFERINGS AND A LOST CIVILISATION!

TRUJILLO, PERU. Archaeologists working at Huaca de la Luna have uncovered the approximately 1,400-year-old burial of a child apparently associated with the Moche elite.

More than thirty ceramic objects accompanied the remains. Their imagery includes birds, prisoners, ritual scenes, combat and divinities.

Investigators also report traces of a possible copper mask near the skull.

The discovery suggests that status and ritual significance could attach to children as well as adults.

The Moche left no newspaper archives.

Their tombs, fortunately, were rather more durable.


THE ANCHORMAN DESK — THE WORLD'S STRANGEST AFFAIRS

WORLD'S BIGGEST PIZZA! 630,496 SLICES OF PEPPERONI — AND NOT A SINGLE SMALL APPETITE!

LOS ANGELES. The officially recorded largest pizza in the world covers 1,296.72 square metres.

It was created in January 2023 by YouTuber Airrack and Pizza Hut at the Los Angeles Convention Center.

The ingredients included approximately 6,193 kilograms of dough, 2,244 kilograms of tomato sauce, 3,992 kilograms of cheese and 630,496 pepperoni slices.

The pizza was assembled and baked in sections before being distributed to charitable organisations.

The record is a triumph of American ingenuity.

It also proves that, somewhere in the United States, somebody looked at an ordinary pizza and concluded that what it really needed was the floor space of a respectable supermarket.

The Italians invented pizza.

The Americans invented a logistical operation to deliver it to history.

AN ANCIENT LETTER REVEALS THE SAME OLD PROBLEM: SOMEBODY WON'T PAY!

KANESH, TURKEY. Researchers using modern scanning techniques have begun reading Assyrian letters still enclosed in their original clay envelopes.

One 3,800-year-old message was written by a woman named Anna-anna to her husband, Ennum-Ashur.

Her complaint concerned a debtor who refused to pay money owed to her husband directly to her.

Nearly four millennia later, the situation requires remarkably little translation.

Civilisation has invented banks, credit cards, electronic transfers and sophisticated financial regulation.

The debtor remains essentially unchanged.


THE KITCHEN — SUNDAY TABLE

THE SUNDAY POT: BEEF BRAISED IN RED WINE





A proper Sunday meal does not require culinary acrobatics. It requires time, good ingredients and the willingness to leave a saucepan alone.

Brasato al vino rosso — Serves four

Use 1 kg of beef chuck, one bottle of dry red wine, two carrots, one onion, two celery stalks, two cloves of garlic, rosemary, bay leaf, olive oil, salt and pepper.

Brown the beef thoroughly in a heavy pot. Remove it, soften the vegetables, return the meat and add the wine, herbs and enough water or stock to keep the liquid about halfway up the beef.

Cover and cook gently for approximately three hours, turning occasionally, until the meat is tender. Reduce the sauce and serve with mashed potatoes or polenta.

A Nebbiolo would be welcome, although it is not necessary to mortgage the house for a Barolo.

The secret is not complicated: cook slowly, eat slowly, and never trust a Sunday lunch that can be prepared in twelve minutes.


BOOKS & IDEAS

THE ARTIFICIAL FRIEND ARRIVES — ISHIGURO'S MACHINE GETS ITS CLOSE-UP!

The release of Taika Waititi's film adaptation of Klara and the Sun brings one of contemporary literature's most interesting questions back into public view.

Klara is an artificial companion whose observations of human life expose the peculiar mixture of affection, calculation and self-deception in human relationships.

The novel is not simply about whether a machine can think.

It asks what human beings expect from a being they have created to serve their emotional needs.

The question is particularly relevant in a culture that increasingly treats artificial intelligence as both a technical instrument and a social interlocutor.

We have spent centuries asking whether machines might become human.

Ishiguro asks a less comfortable question: what happens when human beings begin to behave like the machines they imagine?


ONE HUNDRED YEARS AGO — OCTOBER 1926

THE WORLD OF 1926: PEACE ON PAPER, TROUBLE IN THE MARGINS!

One hundred years ago, Europe was living through the diplomatic optimism that followed the Locarno agreements.

Germany had entered the League of Nations in September 1926. The European powers were attempting to consolidate a security order built around treaties, arbitration and the promise of reconciliation.

The international system looked increasingly institutional.

Yet its foundations remained uncertain.

Germany's eastern frontiers lacked the same guarantees as its western ones. The Soviet Union remained outside much of the European diplomatic settlement. Colonial empires continued to govern vast populations without their consent.

The peace was real, but it was incomplete.

The lesson is not that every peace conference must fail.

It is that a diplomatic settlement can be successful in the questions it answers while remaining dangerously silent about the questions it leaves open.

The world of October 1926 was not already at war.

It was learning how to mistake a partial settlement for a permanent order.


THE PRESS REVIEW — THE FRONT PAGES ON TRIAL

FOUR ELECTIONS, THREE CONTINENTS — AND EVERYBODY HAS FOUND A DIFFERENT CRISIS!

Today's international press offers an instructive spectacle.

Reuters concentrates on the immediate machinery of elections, protests and strategic developments: Brazil's runoff, Serbia's parliamentary contest, Bulgaria's vote and the extension of insecurity into the Black Sea.

The Guardian sees a broader contest over democratic institutions, placing Brazil, Serbia, Israel and the United States within a common political narrative.

Italian reporting, meanwhile, gives understandable prominence to domestic unrest and the policing of demonstrations.

Each approach selects a different centre of gravity.

The wire service asks what happened.

The political newspaper asks what it means.

The national press asks whether it is happening outside the reader's front door.

All three are legitimate journalistic questions. None is the whole story.

There is also a fourth question, rather less fashionable and considerably more uncomfortable:

What connects these events without making them identical?

That is the question this newspaper intends to keep asking.

Not every demonstration is a revolution. Not every election is a referendum on the international order. Not every drone is the beginning of a new war.

But when elections, protests, communications infrastructure and military campaigns begin to affect one another, it becomes difficult to maintain that each belongs in a separate newspaper section.

The front page has become a map.

And the map is getting crowded.


THE WORLD NEWSREEL

Sunday, October 25, 2026

Know today the truths of tomorrow.

THE FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF THE CURRENT HYBRID WAR

 

THE WORLD NEWSREEL

HW1 — THE FIRST HYBRID WAR

THE FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGNS

The Military Expenditure Ledger, 2022–2026

Historical Atlas of HW1 — Economic and Strategic Supplement


AN ANALYSIS FROM
: THE CRITICAL LEGAL ENUIRY - CARDOZO INSTITUTE


The First Hybrid War was fought not only by armies, aircraft and warships, but also through government budgets, industrial production, international credit and the mobilisation of national economies.

Its financial history reveals an important distinction: the money spent maintaining military power was considerably greater than the money directly attributable to individual campaigns.

For this reason, the following account separates total military expenditure, campaign-related assistance and sovereign indebtedness.

I. The Military Expenditure Ledger

The latest internationally comparable annual figures cover the period through December 2025. Expenditure during 2026 remains provisional and is therefore excluded from the consolidated totals.

All amounts are expressed in billions of US dollars.

Power or alliance2025 expenditureConsolidated historical figure
NATO — all members$1,581 bn$5,660 bn, 2022–2025
United States$954 bn$3,744 bn, approximate 2022–2025 total
Russia$190 bn$448 bn, 2023–2025; 2022 excluded
European NATO members$559 bnSeparate cumulative total not established
European Union—Separate EU-27 series required
Israel$48.3 bnFour-year total not established
Iran$7.4 bnFour-year total not established
Ukraine$84.1 bnFour-year total not established

The NATO total is the sum of reported annual alliance expenditure: $1,232 billion in 2022, $1,341 billion in 2023, $1,506 billion in 2024 and $1,581 billion in 2025.

These annual totals reflect changes in NATO membership, including Finland's accession in 2023 and Sweden's in 2024.

The American figure is an approximate sum of annual spending, while Russia's three-year figure deliberately excludes 2022 rather than introducing an insufficiently reconciled estimate.

These are historical expenditure totals, not estimates of the direct cost of HW1. The 2022 totals also include January and most of February, before the opening of the Eastern Campaign.

II. The Balance of Military Expenditure

In 2025, NATO members collectively spent approximately 8.3 times as much on their armed forces as Russia.

The United States alone spent approximately five times as much.

Yet military expenditure cannot be translated mechanically into battlefield superiority.

Personnel costs, procurement prices, exchange rates, industrial structures, geographical commitments and purchasing power differ substantially between countries.

Furthermore, American military expenditure supports global operations, including commitments outside the European and Middle Eastern theatres.

The financial imbalance therefore describes the scale of available military resources, not the outcome of any particular campaign.

III. The Eastern Campaign: The Cost of Supporting Ukraine

Military assistance to Ukraine constitutes one of the most identifiable financial components of HW1.

The European Union, its member states and the United States have supplied weapons, ammunition, training, financial assistance and support for the Ukrainian state.

Two distinct accounting methods must be preserved.

The first records military assistance allocated to Ukraine.

The second records national government appropriations, including procurement, replacement of donated equipment, military operations and other related expenditure.

These figures cannot simply be added together.

For the United States, supplemental appropriations to the Department of Defense for Ukraine-related support reached approximately $127 billion during 2022–2025.

Of this amount, approximately $65.1 billion had been disbursed by the end of 2025.

The difference between appropriation and disbursement is essential: money authorised by a legislature is not necessarily money already spent.

European assistance must likewise be distinguished between commitments, allocations and actual disbursements.

IV. The Ukrainian Sovereign Debt

Ukraine's state and state-guaranteed debt, 31 August 2026: $215.55 billion.

ComponentUSD billions
External public debt164.80
Domestic public debt44.97
State-guaranteed debt5.79
Total215.55

The figures are rounded.

External public debt represented approximately 76.5% of the total.

A substantial proportion of Ukraine's obligations consisted of concessional financing, carrying terms more favourable than ordinary commercial borrowing.

The debt total must not be mistaken for the cost of the war.

It includes obligations incurred before February 2022, as well as financing associated with wartime expenditure and the continued operation of the Ukrainian state.

Nor should military grants be counted as additions to sovereign debt.

A grant transfers resources without creating a repayment obligation. A loan creates a liability, although its economic burden depends upon interest rates, maturity, grace periods and possible restructuring.

V. The Persian and Levantine Campaigns

The financial history of the Persian and Levantine theatres requires a different accounting approach.

Israel's national military expenditure reached $48.3 billion in 2025, while Iran's estimated expenditure was $7.4 billion.

These figures describe annual military spending, not the cumulative operational costs of the campaigns.

An adequate campaign account would separately identify expenditure on aircraft operations, precision-guided weapons, missile launches, air defence, mobilisation, equipment replacement and the protection of maritime communications.

It would also distinguish expenditure by Israel and Iran from the costs incurred by American forces operating in the region.

The published national military budgets cannot, by themselves, supply this operational account.

VI. The European Rearmament

The financial consequences of HW1 extended beyond direct military assistance.

Germany expanded defence expenditure and forward deployments.

Poland accelerated procurement and the expansion of its armed forces.

France maintained overseas and European commitments while increasing defence investment.

Italy strengthened its participation in NATO's eastern deployments and expanded military spending.

Finland and Sweden entered NATO, changing the military geography of northern Europe.

The enlargement of the Alliance and the reinforcement of its eastern flank involved expenditure on equipment, infrastructure, readiness, logistics and military exercises.

Such expenditure belongs to the wider strategic history of HW1, even where the forces concerned did not participate in combat.

VII. The Problem of Double Counting

A financial history of HW1 must avoid three common errors.

First, NATO expenditure cannot be added to American expenditure, because the American total is already included in NATO's accounts.

Second, European Union expenditure cannot be added indiscriminately to NATO expenditure, because most EU member states also belong to NATO.

Third, military assistance supplied by one state and received by another must not automatically be counted twice as an additional resource consumed by the international system.

The appropriate method is to maintain separate accounts for military spending, international transfers, direct campaign costs and public debt.

Only after these categories have been reconciled can a meaningful consolidated estimate be attempted.

VIII. The Historical Balance Sheet

The financial record already establishes the enormous scale of military mobilisation.

Between 2022 and 2025, the annual expenditure totals of NATO members amounted to approximately $5.66 trillion.

In 2025 alone, the United States spent $954 billion, Russia approximately $190 billion, Israel $48.3 billion and Iran an estimated $7.4 billion.

By August 2026, Ukraine's public and state-guaranteed debt had reached $215.55 billion.

But none of these figures, individually or collectively, measures the total economic cost of HW1.

That larger account would require estimates of destroyed infrastructure, lost production, displaced populations, disrupted trade, reconstruction liabilities and the long-term costs of military mobilisation.

The historical significance of the expenditure ledger lies precisely in this distinction.

The cost of maintaining the armed forces, the cost of conducting the campaigns and the economic cost of the international confrontation are three different quantities.

A serious history of HW1 must calculate all three.


The World Newsreel — Historical Atlas of HW1

Financial record compiled from SIPRI military expenditure series and official Ukrainian debt statistics. Annual military spending is distinguished from campaign expenditure, assistance commitments and sovereign liabilities.

Know today the truths of tomorrow.

The principal statistical references are SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, SIPRI 2025 expenditure report and the Ukrainian Ministry of Finance debt statement. 

SIPRI
+4

The $5.66 trillion NATO total is calculated, but the remaining four-year national totals should not be presented as final until the 2022–2025 figures have been reconciled against one consistent SIPRI database vintage. The same applies to the EU-27 total. This is a substantive limitation of the current ledger, rather than a zero-expenditure entry.

THE SIX PRINCIPLES OF WORLD ORDER

 

THE WORLD NEWSREEL

OUR COMMENT ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

THE SIX PRINCIPLES OF WORLD ORDER




Why International Law Is Becoming Incoherent

October 25, 2026 | Strategic Affairs — The Editorial Desk


I. TWO POWERS, TWO GLACIS

Consider two maps.





The first depicts Russia and its western approaches. Ukraine and Belarus form the geographical space separating Russia's European heartland from the military powers of Central Europe. Their political alignment determines the strategic depth available to Moscow.

The second depicts the United States and the Western Pacific. Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and the successive island chains form a strategic perimeter through which American power is projected and the expansion of rival military power is constrained.

The geographical configurations are different. One is predominantly continental; the other maritime. Yet the underlying strategic calculation is remarkably similar.

Neither power defines its security interests exclusively by reference to its sovereign borders.

Both regard the military and political configuration of neighbouring regions as a matter of national security.

This observation does not establish which territorial arrangements are legitimate. It identifies a problem that contemporary international law has never satisfactorily resolved: what principles determine the legitimate organization of international space?

The answer depends upon which conception of world order we adopt.

And there is more than one.

II. THREE MODELS OF LEGITIMACY

Modern international relations are governed by three competing principles of legitimacy.

1. The Realist Model — Kissinger

In World Order (2014), Henry Kissinger returned to a fundamental proposition of classical diplomacy: international order depends upon an equilibrium among major powers, each possessing its own historical experience, strategic interests and conception of legitimacy.

The relevant political units are not necessarily equal in power or influence. International stability emerges from arrangements that accommodate the distribution of power and prevent any single actor from overturning the system.

Its underlying principle resembles constitutional checks and balances, transposed to the international level.

Just as a constitutional system distributes authority among competing institutions, a realist international order distributes effective power among competing geopolitical centres.

Its hard core is equilibrium among great powers and their strategic spaces.

2. The Idealist Model — Wilson

Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points of January 1918 expressed a fundamentally different conception.

The legitimacy of international order rests upon the right of peoples and political communities to determine their own political destiny.

In its universalized form, this principle applies independently of the distribution of military power. A small nation's political independence cannot be made conceptually subordinate to the strategic requirements of a larger neighbour.

The relevant unit is the people or nation-state, not the great-power system.

Its hard core is self-determination.

3. The International Democratic Model — Roosevelt

Franklin D. Roosevelt introduced a third conception, particularly through his Four Freedoms of 1941 and the ideological objectives of the Second World War.

International legitimacy could no longer depend exclusively upon sovereignty or equilibrium. The internal political character of states also became relevant.

Freedom of expression, religious liberty, freedom from want and freedom from fear supplied an emerging international vocabulary of fundamental rights.

In its subsequent development, this conception associates legitimate international conduct with democratic institutions, constitutional government and human rights.

Its hard core is the conformity of political authority and its actions to internationally recognized democratic and human-rights principles.

These three models need not be mutually exclusive. But neither do they necessarily produce the same conclusions.

A territorial arrangement may satisfy the requirements of strategic equilibrium while conflicting with self-determination. A sovereign political decision may conform to national independence while conflicting with a democratic conception of international legitimacy.

Thus the first problem of international law is already apparent: different principles may produce different judgments concerning the legitimacy of the same political situation.

III. THREE MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT

There is, however, a second question, logically distinct from the first.

Even if the legitimate principles of international order could be agreed upon, who would maintain that order?

Here again, three competing models can be identified.

1. The International League Model — The United Nations

Order is maintained through an international organization representing the community of states.

Its institutions establish procedures, formulate collective decisions and authorize measures for the maintenance or restoration of international peace.

The United Nations represents the most developed historical expression of this model, although its Security Council incorporates important great-power privileges.

2. The Hegemonic Model — The American Security System

Order is maintained principally by a predominant military power possessing the capacity to enforce international arrangements.

In the contemporary American experience, this function is associated with the global military establishment, the Pentagon, overseas bases, security guarantees and worldwide operational capabilities.

International order depends not merely upon agreed rules, but upon the military capacity of a hegemonic state to sustain them.

3. The Classical European Model — Spheres of Control

Order is maintained through the coexistence of great powers exercising effective control or predominant influence within their respective strategic spheres.

Rather than requiring a universal institution or a single global enforcer, this model relies upon reciprocal accommodation, territorial arrangements and limitations upon competing interventions.

Its historical reference is the classical European international system, including the traditions of the balance of power and the Concert of Europe.

Once again, these are not necessarily exclusive arrangements.

Roosevelt himself combined an ambitious conception of international freedoms with a proposed system of great-power enforcement. His original Four Policemen envisaged the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and China as the principal guardians of postwar security.

The future United Nations thus emerged partly from a combination of universal institutional aspirations and the recognition of unequal geopolitical power.

IV. THE NINE POSSIBLE ORDERS

The distinction between principles of legitimacy and mechanisms of enforcement produces a simple analytical matrix.

Legitimacy / EnforcementInternational LeagueHegemonic PowerSpheres of Control
RealistCollective management of great-power equilibriumHegemonic stabilization of the balanceReciprocal great-power accommodation
IdealistCollective protection of self-determinationHegemonic protection of national independenceTerritorial autonomy secured by reciprocal restraint
International DemocraticMultilateral enforcement of democratic and human-rights standardsHegemonic enforcement of democratic standardsDifferentiated political orders within respective spheres

These nine combinations are ideal types, not nine mutually exclusive historical systems.

Indeed, the actual positions adopted by states may be understood as variable combinations of all six principles.

Each government, political movement or international institution may adhere more or less strongly to the hard core of each model, producing a particular configuration of legitimacy and enforcement.

A state may invoke self-determination in one dispute, strategic equilibrium in another, and international democratic legitimacy in a third.

It may simultaneously demand enforcement by the United Nations, rely upon the protection of a hegemonic military power, and insist upon freedom of action within its own regional sphere.

Such combinations are not necessarily the result of deliberate inconsistency.

They may reflect the simultaneous operation of different conceptions of world order within the same political and legal system.

V. THE COMBINATORIAL DISORDER

This brings us to the distinctive predicament of contemporary international law.

The usual explanation for the present disorder is that the international community has abandoned the principles upon which the postwar system was constructed.

But perhaps the opposite is closer to the truth.

The crisis may result not from a shortage of principles, but from their proliferation and simultaneous application.

The contemporary international system contains elements of Wilsonian self-determination, Rooseveltian international democracy and Kissingerian equilibrium.

It also contains institutions of collective security, structures of hegemonic military enforcement and persistent spheres of strategic influence.

These principles survive together, despite the fact that they originated in different historical circumstances and rest upon different conceptions of political legitimacy.

They are neither fully integrated into a coherent constitutional order nor arranged according to an agreed hierarchy.

Consequently, different actors can construct plausible but conflicting accounts of the same international event by selecting different combinations of principles.

The disagreement is no longer simply about the interpretation of a particular rule.

It concerns the underlying conception of international order from which the rule derives its meaning.

VI. THE RETURN TO GEOGRAPHY

We may now return to our two maps.

Russia's western glacis and America's Pacific perimeter illustrate the continuing relevance of the realist conception of strategic space.

The competing claims of neighbouring political communities introduce the Wilsonian principle of self-determination.

The political character of governments, the international protection of rights and the institutional commitments of democratic states introduce the Rooseveltian conception.

Finally, the question of who may legitimately preserve, modify or enforce these arrangements introduces the three competing mechanisms of international order.

The result is not a single controversy governed by a single set of principles.

It is a conflict among different combinations of legitimacy and enforcement.

This is why contemporary debates about international law so frequently seem to proceed in parallel rather than converge upon a common answer.

The participants are not always disagreeing about the facts. Nor are they necessarily disagreeing about the text of particular international instruments.

They may be reasoning from different constitutional conceptions of the international system itself.

The resulting incoherence is therefore structural.

The contemporary crisis of international law is not simply the disappearance of world order.

It is the simultaneous operation of several potentially incompatible principles of world order, none of which has succeeded in establishing an undisputed priority over the others.

We live not in a world without principles, but in a world governed by too many competing principles claiming authority over the same events.

And perhaps that is the most revealing feature of the international situation today.


P. G. Monateri

CI-CLE — Critical Legal Enquiry Cardozo Institute



The World Newsreel — Know today the truths of tomorrow.

Historical references: Henry Kissinger, World Order (2014); Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Points Address (January 8, 1918); Franklin D. Roosevelt, Four Freedoms Address (January 6, 1941); Roosevelt's proposals at the Tehran Conference (1943).

A Military and Strategic Chronology, 2022–2026

 

HW1 — THE FIRST HYBRID WAR


The World Newsreel Historical Atlas — Volume I

The Historical Method

The First Hybrid War, or HW1, is the provisional designation adopted by The World Newsreel for the international military and strategic confrontation that developed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.

The designation describes a historical interpretation, not a formally declared war or a single legally constituted armed conflict.

The various campaigns possessed different origins, belligerents and political objectives. Their inclusion in this chronology rests upon identifiable strategic relationships, rather than an assumption that they were directed by a single coalition or headquarters.

For geographical clarity, this atlas employs conventional historical English names familiar from twentieth-century military histories: Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, the Dnieper, the Donets Basin, the Sea of Azov, the Crimea, the Baltic and the Persian Gulf. Contemporary official names may differ.

The period is divided into five successive campaigns.


CAMPAIGN I — 2022

The Great Eastern Offensive

24 February — Opening of the Eastern Campaign.

Russian armies advanced along three principal axes: the northern approaches to Kiev, the Kharkov sector and the southern front extending from the Crimea towards Kherson and the Sea of Azov.

The opening operation displayed the characteristics of a rapid campaign of manoeuvre: airborne assaults, armoured thrusts, simultaneous attacks upon command centres and attempts to disorganise the opposing state before its forces could complete mobilisation.

The assault on Hostomel airfield was intended to support the seizure of Kiev.

The operation failed to achieve its principal political and military objective.

March–April — The Battle of Kiev and the Northern Withdrawal.

Russian forces encountered sustained Ukrainian resistance, logistical difficulties and counterattacks. By early April, the northern offensive had been abandoned.

The withdrawal from the Kiev sector represented the first major reversal of the campaign.

13–14 April 2022 — The Battle of the Black Sea: Sinking of the Moskva.

Ukrainian coastal forces struck the Russian guided-missile cruiser Moskva, flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, with Neptune anti-ship missiles. Severely damaged, the cruiser sank on 14 April while under tow. Russia acknowledged the sinking but disputed the Ukrainian account of the attack.

The loss of the Moskva was a major naval reversal. It deprived the Russian Black Sea Fleet of its flagship and an important air-defence platform, demonstrating the vulnerability of large surface warships to land-based anti-ship missiles.

Strategic assessment: Although Ukraine possessed no comparable surface fleet, its coastal missile forces had inflicted a major defeat upon Russian naval power. The engagement foreshadowed the subsequent struggle for control of the western Black Sea and the approaches to Odessa.

May — The Siege of Mariupol.

Russian forces completed the capture of Mariupol, securing the land corridor along the northern coast of the Sea of Azov.

The southern campaign had achieved more durable territorial results than the northern offensive.

September — The Battle of Kharkov.

Ukrainian forces launched a rapid counteroffensive, recovering extensive territory east and southeast of Kharkov, including Izium and Kupiansk.

November — The Dnieper Withdrawal.

Russian forces withdrew from the western bank of the Dnieper at Kherson.

The year ended without the decisive victory sought by the initial invasion.

The Intervention of the Western Powers

The United States supplied intelligence, financial assistance, artillery, air-defence systems and other military equipment.

Britain expanded training and weapons deliveries.

Poland became a principal logistical centre for the movement of military assistance into Ukraine and reinforced its own eastern defences.

Germany abandoned important elements of its previous security policy, increased military spending and began expanding arms deliveries.

France supplied weapons and participated in strengthening NATO deployments in Eastern Europe.

Italy contributed military assistance and reinforced NATO's defensive presence, particularly in southeastern Europe.

These measures did not constitute a NATO invasion of Russian territory or make the Alliance a collective belligerent in Ukraine.

They nevertheless altered the strategic balance of the Eastern Campaign.

Strategic assessment: the attempt to achieve a rapid decision failed. The conflict expanded from an invasion of Ukraine into a prolonged confrontation affecting the security architecture of Europe.


CAMPAIGN II — 2023

The Consolidation of the Eastern Front and the Opening of the Flanks

January–May — The Battle of Bakhmut.

Russian forces, including substantial Wagner formations, conducted a prolonged assault on Bakhmut in the Donets Basin.

The capture of the city followed months of exceptionally costly fighting.

June–Autumn — The Southern Offensive.

Ukrainian forces attempted to penetrate Russian defensive positions towards the Sea of Azov.

Minefields, artillery, prepared fortifications and extensive drone reconnaissance prevented a decisive breakthrough.

The principal Eastern Front increasingly assumed the character of a fortified zone.

15 April — Opening of the Sudan Campaign.

Fighting erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces.

Khartoum became a major battlefield. The campaign subsequently extended through the Darfur and Kordofan regions.

Its inclusion in HW1 is based on its international repercussions and external military relationships, not upon a demonstrated operational connection with the Eastern Campaign.

7 October — Opening of the Palestine Campaign.

Hamas-led forces attacked southern Israel. Israeli forces subsequently conducted a major campaign in the Gaza Strip.

8 October — The Lebanese Frontier.

Exchanges of fire began between Hezbollah and Israel.

November — The Red Sea Campaign.

Houthi operations against commercial shipping transformed the southern approaches to the Suez Canal into a maritime security theatre.

The Northern Strategic Reorganisation

On 4 April 2023, Finland entered NATO.

This was one of the most consequential strategic changes of the period.

The Finnish frontier added approximately 1,340 kilometres of Russian-NATO land border.

The Baltic and Arctic approaches consequently acquired greater significance in Alliance planning.

Germany, France, Britain, Poland and the Nordic states began adjusting military deployments and defence planning to the altered strategic geography.

Strategic assessment: the Eastern Front became increasingly difficult to penetrate. Meanwhile, other campaigns developed in Africa and the Middle East, and the northern European strategic system underwent a major reorganisation.


CAMPAIGN III — 2024

The Great Attempts at Breakthrough

February — The Battle of Avdeevka.

Russian forces captured Avdeevka after prolonged fighting, compelling a Ukrainian withdrawal.

The operation demonstrated that fortified positions could still be taken, although often at considerable cost.

May — The Second Kharkov Offensive.

Russian formations crossed the frontier north of Kharkov, attempting to create new tactical opportunities and compel Ukrainian forces to divert reserves.

The offensive did not achieve a decisive strategic breakthrough.

6 August — The Kursk Offensive.

Ukrainian forces entered Russian territory in the Kursk region.

The operation introduced a new geographical dimension to the Eastern Campaign, obliging Russia to defend territory beyond the previously established front.

September–October — The Lebanese Offensive.

Israel intensified operations against Hezbollah, including attacks upon its command structure and communications systems, followed by ground operations in southern Lebanon.

April and October — The Persian Missile Engagements.

Iran and Israel exchanged direct missile and aerial attacks, demonstrating the possibility that indirect confrontation might develop into sustained interstate operations.

NATO's Great European Manoeuvres

From January to May 2024, NATO conducted Steadfast Defender 24, involving approximately 90,000 personnel.

The exercise rehearsed the reinforcement of Europe by forces arriving from North America, the defence of Atlantic communications and the movement of formations across the European continent.

It was a military exercise, not an attack upon Russia.

Its historical significance lay in the scale of mobilisation and in the renewed emphasis on continental reinforcement.

On 7 March 2024, Sweden entered NATO.

The accession of Sweden, following that of Finland, transformed the strategic geometry of the Baltic.

The northern European defence system now included both states as full members of the Atlantic Alliance.

Strategic assessment: the principal Eastern Front remained contested. Offensive operations sought opportunities along its northern and southern sectors, while the Baltic, Arctic and Middle Eastern theatres gained importance.


CAMPAIGN IV — 2025

The War of Depth and Strategic Interdiction

January–March — The Sudanese Counteroffensive.

Sudanese government forces recovered important positions in Khartoum, eventually re-establishing control over the capital.

The Rapid Support Forces continued operations elsewhere, especially in western Sudan.

March–April — The Kursk Withdrawal.

Russian counteroperations recovered the principal areas occupied by Ukrainian forces during the previous year's offensive.

1 June — Operation Spiderweb.

Ukrainian drones attacked Russian military airfields far from the established front.

The operation illustrated the growing importance of strategic interdiction conducted through comparatively inexpensive unmanned systems.

13–24 June — The Twelve-Day Persian Campaign.

Israeli air operations struck Iranian military and nuclear-related targets.

Iran responded with missile and drone attacks.

The United States subsequently struck Iranian nuclear facilities.

A ceasefire ended the principal exchange of attacks, but not the underlying strategic confrontation.

The Deployment of the European Powers

Germany: continued expansion of military assistance to Ukraine and the development of a permanent brigade deployment in Lithuania, marking a significant change in German forward-defence policy.

France: maintained its leading role in NATO's multinational presence in Romania and continued supplying military equipment and training to Ukraine.

Italy: led NATO's multinational battlegroup in Bulgaria and contributed to other eastern deployments, alongside military assistance to Ukraine.

Poland: continued to serve as a major logistical hub, expanded military procurement and maintained a central position in NATO's northeastern defence planning.

Britain: maintained a leading NATO presence in Estonia, supported Ukrainian training and strengthened northern European security cooperation.

NATO also launched Baltic Sentry following incidents affecting critical undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea.

Strategic assessment: the contest increasingly extended beyond the front line. Military airfields, industrial production, maritime routes, communications and energy infrastructure became strategically significant targets or vulnerabilities.


CAMPAIGN V — 2026

The Great Persian Offensive and the Extension of the Maritime Front

28 February — Opening of the Great Persian Offensive.

United States and Israeli forces launched major strikes against Iran, targeting military command structures, missile capabilities and nuclear-related facilities.

The operation represented a substantial escalation from the limited direct engagements of previous years.

Iran retaliated against Israel, American military facilities and targets across the Gulf region.

March — The Gulf Counteroffensive.

Iranian missile and drone operations expanded the geographical consequences of the campaign.

The Strait of Hormuz became a central point of strategic and economic pressure.

Maritime interdiction, restrictions on shipping and attacks upon regional military infrastructure gave the campaign consequences far beyond the immediate battlefield.

March — Renewal of the Lebanese Campaign.

The confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah again intensified, adding pressure to the eastern Mediterranean theatre.

April–October — The Persian Armistice Negotiations and Maritime Confrontation.

Negotiations, pauses in operations, continuing military pressure and disputes over navigation and sanctions followed the initial offensive.

These developments constituted successive phases of the Persian Campaign, rather than the outbreak of a separate war each time military operations resumed.

The Northern and Eastern European Deployment

In June 2026, NATO established a multinational forward land force in Finland, led by Sweden.

Germany continued its military presence in Lithuania.

France remained the framework nation for the multinational force in Romania.

Italy retained its framework role in Bulgaria and contributed to several other multinational formations.

Poland continued to occupy a central position in NATO's eastern logistical and defensive system.

These deployments formed part of NATO's deterrence and collective-defence posture. They must be distinguished from combat operations within Ukraine.

Strategic assessment: by October 2026, the international confrontation included sustained land operations in Eastern Europe, direct aerial and maritime operations in the Persian Gulf, continuing military crises in the Levant and Sudan, and extensive NATO preparations along the European frontier.


THE FIVE CAMPAIGNS AT A GLANCE

YearMilitary characterPrincipal development
2022Campaign of manoeuvreInvasion, rapid advances, failed decision at Kiev, counteroffensives
2023Consolidation and flanking campaignsFortified fronts, Sudan, Palestine, Red Sea, Finnish accession
2024Breakthrough attemptsKharkov, Kursk, Avdeevka, Lebanese operations, Swedish accession, NATO manoeuvres
2025Strategic interdictionDeep drone strikes, Sudanese counteroffensive, Twelve-Day Persian Campaign, European forward deployments
2026Major Persian offensiveUS–Israeli strikes, Iranian retaliation, Gulf maritime confrontation, northern NATO reinforcement

The Strategic Position in October 2026

The First Hybrid War had not produced a single continuous front extending across continents.

It had produced something structurally different: a series of military theatres connected by alliances, strategic resources, industrial capacities, technological systems and international institutions.

The Eastern Campaign remained predominantly a struggle for territory.

The Persian Campaign placed air power, missiles, maritime access and economic coercion at its centre.

The Sudanese Campaign combined territorial warfare with the involvement of armed formations and external interests.

The Baltic and Arctic regions became theatres of deterrence, military preparation and strategic competition rather than open conventional battle between NATO and Russian forces.

The distinction is essential.

A historical atlas must record where armies actually fought, where governments supplied matériel, where alliances deployed troops and where military operations remained hypothetical.

The unity of HW1 is therefore a proposition about the structure of the international system.

It is not a claim that all participating states belonged to two formally constituted opposing armies.

The central historical question is whether these campaigns, taken together, constituted a new form of prolonged international war — one whose political and strategic boundaries extended far beyond its battlefields.

Chronology closed: 24 October 2026.

The World Newsreel — Historical Atlas of HW1