HW1 — THE FIRST HYBRID WAR
The World Newsreel Historical Atlas — Volume I
The Historical Method
The First Hybrid War, or HW1, is the provisional designation adopted by The World Newsreel for the international military and strategic confrontation that developed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.
The designation describes a historical interpretation, not a formally declared war or a single legally constituted armed conflict.
The various campaigns possessed different origins, belligerents and political objectives. Their inclusion in this chronology rests upon identifiable strategic relationships, rather than an assumption that they were directed by a single coalition or headquarters.
For geographical clarity, this atlas employs conventional historical English names familiar from twentieth-century military histories: Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, the Dnieper, the Donets Basin, the Sea of Azov, the Crimea, the Baltic and the Persian Gulf. Contemporary official names may differ.
The period is divided into five successive campaigns.
CAMPAIGN I — 2022
The Great Eastern Offensive
24 February — Opening of the Eastern Campaign.
Russian armies advanced along three principal axes: the northern approaches to Kiev, the Kharkov sector and the southern front extending from the Crimea towards Kherson and the Sea of Azov.
The opening operation displayed the characteristics of a rapid campaign of manoeuvre: airborne assaults, armoured thrusts, simultaneous attacks upon command centres and attempts to disorganise the opposing state before its forces could complete mobilisation.
The assault on Hostomel airfield was intended to support the seizure of Kiev.
The operation failed to achieve its principal political and military objective.
March–April — The Battle of Kiev and the Northern Withdrawal.
Russian forces encountered sustained Ukrainian resistance, logistical difficulties and counterattacks. By early April, the northern offensive had been abandoned.
The withdrawal from the Kiev sector represented the first major reversal of the campaign.
13–14 April 2022 — The Battle of the Black Sea: Sinking of the Moskva.
Ukrainian coastal forces struck the Russian guided-missile cruiser Moskva, flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, with Neptune anti-ship missiles. Severely damaged, the cruiser sank on 14 April while under tow. Russia acknowledged the sinking but disputed the Ukrainian account of the attack.
The loss of the Moskva was a major naval reversal. It deprived the Russian Black Sea Fleet of its flagship and an important air-defence platform, demonstrating the vulnerability of large surface warships to land-based anti-ship missiles.
Strategic assessment: Although Ukraine possessed no comparable surface fleet, its coastal missile forces had inflicted a major defeat upon Russian naval power. The engagement foreshadowed the subsequent struggle for control of the western Black Sea and the approaches to Odessa.
May — The Siege of Mariupol.
Russian forces completed the capture of Mariupol, securing the land corridor along the northern coast of the Sea of Azov.
The southern campaign had achieved more durable territorial results than the northern offensive.
September — The Battle of Kharkov.
Ukrainian forces launched a rapid counteroffensive, recovering extensive territory east and southeast of Kharkov, including Izium and Kupiansk.
November — The Dnieper Withdrawal.
Russian forces withdrew from the western bank of the Dnieper at Kherson.
The year ended without the decisive victory sought by the initial invasion.
The Intervention of the Western Powers
The United States supplied intelligence, financial assistance, artillery, air-defence systems and other military equipment.
Britain expanded training and weapons deliveries.
Poland became a principal logistical centre for the movement of military assistance into Ukraine and reinforced its own eastern defences.
Germany abandoned important elements of its previous security policy, increased military spending and began expanding arms deliveries.
France supplied weapons and participated in strengthening NATO deployments in Eastern Europe.
Italy contributed military assistance and reinforced NATO's defensive presence, particularly in southeastern Europe.
These measures did not constitute a NATO invasion of Russian territory or make the Alliance a collective belligerent in Ukraine.
They nevertheless altered the strategic balance of the Eastern Campaign.
Strategic assessment: the attempt to achieve a rapid decision failed. The conflict expanded from an invasion of Ukraine into a prolonged confrontation affecting the security architecture of Europe.
CAMPAIGN II — 2023
The Consolidation of the Eastern Front and the Opening of the Flanks
January–May — The Battle of Bakhmut.
Russian forces, including substantial Wagner formations, conducted a prolonged assault on Bakhmut in the Donets Basin.
The capture of the city followed months of exceptionally costly fighting.
June–Autumn — The Southern Offensive.
Ukrainian forces attempted to penetrate Russian defensive positions towards the Sea of Azov.
Minefields, artillery, prepared fortifications and extensive drone reconnaissance prevented a decisive breakthrough.
The principal Eastern Front increasingly assumed the character of a fortified zone.
15 April — Opening of the Sudan Campaign.
Fighting erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces.
Khartoum became a major battlefield. The campaign subsequently extended through the Darfur and Kordofan regions.
Its inclusion in HW1 is based on its international repercussions and external military relationships, not upon a demonstrated operational connection with the Eastern Campaign.
7 October — Opening of the Palestine Campaign.
Hamas-led forces attacked southern Israel. Israeli forces subsequently conducted a major campaign in the Gaza Strip.
8 October — The Lebanese Frontier.
Exchanges of fire began between Hezbollah and Israel.
November — The Red Sea Campaign.
Houthi operations against commercial shipping transformed the southern approaches to the Suez Canal into a maritime security theatre.
The Northern Strategic Reorganisation
On 4 April 2023, Finland entered NATO.
This was one of the most consequential strategic changes of the period.
The Finnish frontier added approximately 1,340 kilometres of Russian-NATO land border.
The Baltic and Arctic approaches consequently acquired greater significance in Alliance planning.
Germany, France, Britain, Poland and the Nordic states began adjusting military deployments and defence planning to the altered strategic geography.
Strategic assessment: the Eastern Front became increasingly difficult to penetrate. Meanwhile, other campaigns developed in Africa and the Middle East, and the northern European strategic system underwent a major reorganisation.
CAMPAIGN III — 2024
The Great Attempts at Breakthrough
February — The Battle of Avdeevka.
Russian forces captured Avdeevka after prolonged fighting, compelling a Ukrainian withdrawal.
The operation demonstrated that fortified positions could still be taken, although often at considerable cost.
May — The Second Kharkov Offensive.
Russian formations crossed the frontier north of Kharkov, attempting to create new tactical opportunities and compel Ukrainian forces to divert reserves.
The offensive did not achieve a decisive strategic breakthrough.
6 August — The Kursk Offensive.
Ukrainian forces entered Russian territory in the Kursk region.
The operation introduced a new geographical dimension to the Eastern Campaign, obliging Russia to defend territory beyond the previously established front.
September–October — The Lebanese Offensive.
Israel intensified operations against Hezbollah, including attacks upon its command structure and communications systems, followed by ground operations in southern Lebanon.
April and October — The Persian Missile Engagements.
Iran and Israel exchanged direct missile and aerial attacks, demonstrating the possibility that indirect confrontation might develop into sustained interstate operations.
NATO's Great European Manoeuvres
From January to May 2024, NATO conducted Steadfast Defender 24, involving approximately 90,000 personnel.
The exercise rehearsed the reinforcement of Europe by forces arriving from North America, the defence of Atlantic communications and the movement of formations across the European continent.
It was a military exercise, not an attack upon Russia.
Its historical significance lay in the scale of mobilisation and in the renewed emphasis on continental reinforcement.
On 7 March 2024, Sweden entered NATO.
The accession of Sweden, following that of Finland, transformed the strategic geometry of the Baltic.
The northern European defence system now included both states as full members of the Atlantic Alliance.
Strategic assessment: the principal Eastern Front remained contested. Offensive operations sought opportunities along its northern and southern sectors, while the Baltic, Arctic and Middle Eastern theatres gained importance.
CAMPAIGN IV — 2025
The War of Depth and Strategic Interdiction
January–March — The Sudanese Counteroffensive.
Sudanese government forces recovered important positions in Khartoum, eventually re-establishing control over the capital.
The Rapid Support Forces continued operations elsewhere, especially in western Sudan.
March–April — The Kursk Withdrawal.
Russian counteroperations recovered the principal areas occupied by Ukrainian forces during the previous year's offensive.
1 June — Operation Spiderweb.
Ukrainian drones attacked Russian military airfields far from the established front.
The operation illustrated the growing importance of strategic interdiction conducted through comparatively inexpensive unmanned systems.
13–24 June — The Twelve-Day Persian Campaign.
Israeli air operations struck Iranian military and nuclear-related targets.
Iran responded with missile and drone attacks.
The United States subsequently struck Iranian nuclear facilities.
A ceasefire ended the principal exchange of attacks, but not the underlying strategic confrontation.
The Deployment of the European Powers
Germany: continued expansion of military assistance to Ukraine and the development of a permanent brigade deployment in Lithuania, marking a significant change in German forward-defence policy.
France: maintained its leading role in NATO's multinational presence in Romania and continued supplying military equipment and training to Ukraine.
Italy: led NATO's multinational battlegroup in Bulgaria and contributed to other eastern deployments, alongside military assistance to Ukraine.
Poland: continued to serve as a major logistical hub, expanded military procurement and maintained a central position in NATO's northeastern defence planning.
Britain: maintained a leading NATO presence in Estonia, supported Ukrainian training and strengthened northern European security cooperation.
NATO also launched Baltic Sentry following incidents affecting critical undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea.
Strategic assessment: the contest increasingly extended beyond the front line. Military airfields, industrial production, maritime routes, communications and energy infrastructure became strategically significant targets or vulnerabilities.
CAMPAIGN V — 2026
The Great Persian Offensive and the Extension of the Maritime Front
28 February — Opening of the Great Persian Offensive.
United States and Israeli forces launched major strikes against Iran, targeting military command structures, missile capabilities and nuclear-related facilities.
The operation represented a substantial escalation from the limited direct engagements of previous years.
Iran retaliated against Israel, American military facilities and targets across the Gulf region.
March — The Gulf Counteroffensive.
Iranian missile and drone operations expanded the geographical consequences of the campaign.
The Strait of Hormuz became a central point of strategic and economic pressure.
Maritime interdiction, restrictions on shipping and attacks upon regional military infrastructure gave the campaign consequences far beyond the immediate battlefield.
March — Renewal of the Lebanese Campaign.
The confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah again intensified, adding pressure to the eastern Mediterranean theatre.
April–October — The Persian Armistice Negotiations and Maritime Confrontation.
Negotiations, pauses in operations, continuing military pressure and disputes over navigation and sanctions followed the initial offensive.
These developments constituted successive phases of the Persian Campaign, rather than the outbreak of a separate war each time military operations resumed.
The Northern and Eastern European Deployment
In June 2026, NATO established a multinational forward land force in Finland, led by Sweden.
Germany continued its military presence in Lithuania.
France remained the framework nation for the multinational force in Romania.
Italy retained its framework role in Bulgaria and contributed to several other multinational formations.
Poland continued to occupy a central position in NATO's eastern logistical and defensive system.
These deployments formed part of NATO's deterrence and collective-defence posture. They must be distinguished from combat operations within Ukraine.
Strategic assessment: by October 2026, the international confrontation included sustained land operations in Eastern Europe, direct aerial and maritime operations in the Persian Gulf, continuing military crises in the Levant and Sudan, and extensive NATO preparations along the European frontier.
THE FIVE CAMPAIGNS AT A GLANCE
| Year | Military character | Principal development |
|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Campaign of manoeuvre | Invasion, rapid advances, failed decision at Kiev, counteroffensives |
| 2023 | Consolidation and flanking campaigns | Fortified fronts, Sudan, Palestine, Red Sea, Finnish accession |
| 2024 | Breakthrough attempts | Kharkov, Kursk, Avdeevka, Lebanese operations, Swedish accession, NATO manoeuvres |
| 2025 | Strategic interdiction | Deep drone strikes, Sudanese counteroffensive, Twelve-Day Persian Campaign, European forward deployments |
| 2026 | Major Persian offensive | US–Israeli strikes, Iranian retaliation, Gulf maritime confrontation, northern NATO reinforcement |
The Strategic Position in October 2026
The First Hybrid War had not produced a single continuous front extending across continents.
It had produced something structurally different: a series of military theatres connected by alliances, strategic resources, industrial capacities, technological systems and international institutions.
The Eastern Campaign remained predominantly a struggle for territory.
The Persian Campaign placed air power, missiles, maritime access and economic coercion at its centre.
The Sudanese Campaign combined territorial warfare with the involvement of armed formations and external interests.
The Baltic and Arctic regions became theatres of deterrence, military preparation and strategic competition rather than open conventional battle between NATO and Russian forces.
The distinction is essential.
A historical atlas must record where armies actually fought, where governments supplied matériel, where alliances deployed troops and where military operations remained hypothetical.
The unity of HW1 is therefore a proposition about the structure of the international system.
It is not a claim that all participating states belonged to two formally constituted opposing armies.
The central historical question is whether these campaigns, taken together, constituted a new form of prolonged international war — one whose political and strategic boundaries extended far beyond its battlefields.
Chronology closed: 24 October 2026.
The World Newsreel — Historical Atlas of HW1
